Is Modernity Colonial? How so?

Is Modernity Colonial? How so?

“Now it so happens that during the struggle for liberation, at the moment that the native intellectual comes into touch again with his people, this artificial sentinel is turned into dust.” – Frantz Fanon (2001: 36)

            In his seminal work, The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon describes the native intellectual’s gradual disillusionment with the values of Western society. For Fanon, the values of modernity, liberal rational progress toward an enlightened humanity, represent in actual practice the moral justification for the divide between the colonizing Self and the native Other. As the native intellectual becomes aware of the true struggle located in the people of the countryside, the values of Western modernity come to be realized as a tool of oppression rather than liberation. For Fanon, it is in the struggle of the people that true enlightenment is to take place. Though Fanon’s vision of a third world liberated from the values of Western civilization has not been realized in contemporary society, his diagnosis of modernity as essential to the colonial project rings true. The very idea of progress essential to modernity and the idea of the modern as new relies on the construction of a backward Other in order to sustain itself. This discursive power of modernity and the global shift in material power that takes place during the 19^th century mutually reinforce each other in the creation and subsistence of global hierarchies of Self and Other.  The colonial nature of these relations lay the discursive foundation for what Partha Chatterjee terms a ‘global practice of power’ based on the metropole’s potential power to declare the colonial exception. In locating the colonial tendency in a unique shift in the philosophy and history of modernity I also aim to expose the limits of liberal humanistic philosophies’ ability to examine the nature of the colonial situation that they are complicit in creating. 

            This paper proceeds in three distinct parts. First, an examination of Tzvetan Todorov’s work The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other takes place in order to lay a philosophical foundation for a critique of the modern project as the bifurcation of Self and Other. While Todorov lays out an impressive framework to establish the problematique of Self/Other relations his own faith in the modern project leads him to the reproduction of the same categories that he sought to avoid. Todorov’s philosophical definition of modernity and his subject of study also lead him to underestimate the social, political and economic effects of historical modernity that take place during the nineteenth century. The second part of this paper uses Partha Chatterjee’s The Black Hole of Empire: A Global Practice of Power as a critique of the shortcomings of Todorov. It is also in Chatterjee that we find the norm-deviation structure that lays out the discursive framework for a colonial modernity as well as a distinct shift in global power relations. Both the discursive power and the material power reinforce each other and culminate in the power to declare the colonial exception and the ultimate representation of the colonial relations of modernity. Finally this paper will examine Todorov from the point of view of the oppressed using Frantz Fanon’sThe Wretched of the Earth to examine the implications for a gaze from liberal modernity that looks critically at itself but from a position of unacknowledged power.

            Before moving to Todorov, it is important to define what I mean by modernity. As Frederick Cooper (2005: 113) has recently pointed out the deployment of the word ‘modernity’ has so many different meanings that the usefulness of the term itself comes into question. In this essay, two interrelated definitions of modernity emerge; a philosophical definition of modernity and a historical definition of modernity. The philosophical definition of modernity defines what it means to be a modern. It is the discourse used to distinguish the modern epoch from theprevious.Simplifying to an extent, philosophical modernity is defined by a belief that through reason man (as individuals) can progress to a fundamentally better life than the one before. (Pippin, 2003: 4) While defining itself in juxtaposition to life before, philosophical modernity relies on the construction of the irrational, traditional Other to justify the progressive, reasonable Self.

The historical definition of modernity refers to the long nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1996) and the social, political and economic global transformation that takes place during that time. As Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2013: 621) argue the global transformation revolve around three key changes: the rise of industrial capitalism, the emergence of the nation-state and, closely linked with philosophical modernity, ideologies of progress. The global transformation grounds these discourses of modernity in historical context that demonstrate how the process of colonization itself created and reinforced social, political and economic global hierarchies. It is important to note that both the ideology of philosophical modernity and the social consequences of the nineteenth century played out in a messy and uneven process that was particular to different historical contexts. Nonetheless, seeing philosophical modernity and historical modernity in tandem exposes how the social, political and economic consequences of the nineteenth century and the narratives established by the philosophers of modernity reinforce one another. Through this mutual co-constitution, not only of historical and philosophical modernity, but of East and West, the ‘global practice of power’ emerges around the power to declare the colonial exception.

Tzvetan Todorov’s The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other demonstrates a lucid attempt to come to terms with the philosophical implications of modernity for Self/Other relations. Todorov’s work ultimately fails, however, because he stays committed to the very modern project he seems to indict in his book. For Todorov the genocidal encounter between the Spanish Conquistadors and the Native Americans constitutes the formative moment in the understanding of Western modernity. In his retelling Todorov aims to tell a moral history of the present in order to answer the question: “How to do deal with the other?” Central to this project is Todorov’s commitment to a narrative style throughout his work and more often than not attempts to allow the words of the actors involved in this interaction speak for themselves. While remaining committed to an open narrative style throughout the text, towards the end of the work Todorov proposes that through this victory of semiotics, European logos has conquered mythos. Todorov simultaneously implicates modernity in the utter destruction of an entire peoples, which acknowledging the potential for modernity to rectify modernity’s breaking with the world and bring it back into harmony. I argue that Todorov’s argument is a profound step in the indictment of modernity as destructive, but that in attempting to recover some of the healthy parts of philosophical modernity it does not recognize the reliance the modern Self has on the construction of the Other. Modernity is not the discovery of the colonial Other, it is the very creation of it.

At the heart of Todorov’s argument in The Conquest of America is the idea that the genocidal encounter between the Spanish Conquistadors and the Native Americans was a defining moment in the identity formation of modernity. Todorov’s explanation for choosing this historical event as the subject for his moral investigation is predicated on this encounter as specifically unique because it was a genuine encounter between two previously unknown peoples. (Todorov, 1999: 4) This radical encounter with the Other, for Todorov symbolizes a defining moment in modernity because it “establishes our present identity.” (Todorov, 1999: 5) Through this event, Todorov argues, “men have discovered the totality of which they are a part.” (Todorov, 1999:5) The implications for this argument that is that the encounter between radical others and the means of victory of one civilization, logos, over another, mythos, shapes our present understanding of the world today. (Todorov, 1999:253)  As part of his moral project, he hopes to propose his work through a narrative style instead of imposing it through systematic analysis. Similarly, Todorov is sensitive to the critique of promoting European superiority and goes to lengths to discount the possibility. The complexities of Todorov’s argument caution us against thinking in terms of European superiority.

Todorov argues that what is uniquely modern and exhibits the capacity for destruction is the radical othering itself. The victory of logos over mythos takes place because the Spanish utilizedlanguage to act whereas the Aztecs reacted. Todorov (1999: 89-90) argues that “for the Aztecs, signs automatically and necessarily proceed from the world they designate, rather than being a weapon intended to manipulate the Other.”Todorov (1999: 112) goes on to demonstrate how the cold, calculating and rational manipulation of signs by Cortes is part of a coherent strategy to bring about the end of the Other.It is the use of signs as a weapon for manipulation that logos should be associated with. Here Todorov (1999: 145) seems to be indicting the philosophical modernity of reasoned, rational progress based on the individual in the civilization of massacre. Instead of being seen as natural progress toward an enlightened and ultimately better world, logos is complicit with the manipulation of the Other. Not only is it complicit in the manipulation of the Other, but it is also a part of the utter and horrific destruction of the Other. He explains: “But this victory from which we all derive…delivers as well a terrible blow to our capacity to feel harmony with the world.” (Todorov, 1999: 97)However, Todorov’s faith in the liberal humanistic project of philosophical modernity is evident in his belief that the world has the capability of being brought into harmony. It is in this juxtaposition between the capacity for the destruction latent in modernity and Todorov’s conviction in project of bringing the world through understanding that the cracks in Todorov’s argument begin to be exposed.

In answering Todorov’s original question, “How to deal with the other?” it is the Othering itself that seems to lead to aberrant destruction. Todorov (1999: 144) argues that “The more remote and alien the victims, the better, they are exterminated without remorse, more or less identified with animals.” Todorov highlights two equally unappealing sides to the reasoning of the Spaniards. The first, exemplified by an early Las Casas is one of equality corrupted into identity and therefore necessary assimilation and colonization. The second, highlighted by Gines de Selpuveda, is that of difference but also inequality, inferiority and therefore enslavement or destruction.

Both figures represent a failure on the part of philosophical modernity to adequately deal with the question of the Other. In Las Casas we have a figure (identifiable in contemporary society with human rights advocates) who seeks to project his universal values onto the Other and assimilate him into the ‘correct’ way of life. Though Las Casas bases his universalism on Christianity (Todorov, 1999: 160-161), Todorov’s critique can also be read as one of liberal universalism that seeks to extend the same rights of man to the globe. In Todorov’s (1999:153) reading of Sepulveda we have a critique of the idea that in order for the modern Self to establish itself relies on the binaries established around Self/Other that follow the logic of good/evil. At the same time that Todorov critiques philosophical modernity, his solution and faith in a rational reconfiguration of how to deal with the Other represents complicity with the same project. The solution is a balance between the two whereby we experience “difference in equality.” (Todorov, 1999: 250) Key to this argument is the difference between proposing and imposing.

This “difference in equality” is exemplified by combining the figure of Bernando de Sahagun, who lays down the foundations for a potential future dialogue and the solution to the problem of “the Other”, with that of Cabeza de Vaca. Sahagun’s dialogue is comparable to that of Todorov, who mirrors his method in order to discover the Other in his own work. For Sahagun, as for Todorov, a dialogue between cultures cannot be reduced to a method, the words must be allowed to speak for themselves and a hybridization of cultures must be resisted. The intention for both authors is to “juxtapose voices.” (Todorov, 1999: 241) This is the beginning of a potential dialogue across cultures for Todorov (1999: 153) for through this dialogue one can propose instead of impose.Similarly Cabeza de Vaca represents a certain modernity in the symbol of the modern exile, who is no longer purely one (as exemplified by the universalism of Christianity), but is instead suspended between two different cultures, belonging to neither. (Todorov, 1999: 250) This figure is also echoed by that La Malinche, of whom Todorov (1999, 100) says represents “we are inevitably bi- or tri-cultural.”While acknowledging the incredible destruction caused at the outset of modernity, Todorov also recognizes the tremendous potential of modernity to overcome the problem of the Other.

Far from Todorov’s narrative style being a celebration of logos conquering mythos, it is actually a response to it. The ethical principles to adhere to is that moral reasoning is possible when information is democratized and used as nonviolent communication. (Todorov, 1999: 182) Similarly, Todorov believes that by bringing two narratives together in juxtaposition, he can propose rather than impose his moral critique, which is contingent because it is not based on the natural superiority of one over the other. But this in itself can be read as complicit with the modern philosophical project. The potential for progress comes in because history and culture is contingent and relative and by recognizing this contingency we open ourselves up to “imperceptible shifts.” (Todorov, 1999: 254) Language, reason and a faith in progress, despite its tremendous capacity for destruction, also has the incredible capacity for construction and so logos retains its value in its potential to bring the world back into harmony. But in retaining his faith in logosand the modern philosophical project Todorov fails to grasp the true nature of the relationship between modernity and colonialism and opens himself up to critique.

Todorov begins to expose the problematic of the modern condition based on the juxtaposition between the Self/Otherbut fails to recognize how his own faith in progress and logos is complicit in the very creation of the Other.Todorov’s failure is evident in the way he reproduces the myth of the ‘noble savage’ he seeks to discredit. In the reproduction of the myth, Todorov (with the possible exception of the figure of La Malinche) does not give sufficient agency to the Other and ignores the struggle that takes place over identity between Self/Other. Similarly, by choosing a study based on the conquest of America, Todorov is equally inattentive to the social, political and economic consequences of the co-constitution of philosophical and historical modernity and that limit the potential for non-violent dialogue to take place. In order to critique and rectify Todorov’s project, it is to Partha Chatterjee’s The Black Hole of Empire that we turn. Chatterjee shows how the norm-deviation structure of modern European philosophy lay the discursive framework of a global practice of power. In doing so, he exposes the shortcomings of Todorov and explicates the social consequences of modernity as well as the co-constitution of the modern subject through Self/Other relations. The power to decide the colonial exception combined with modernity’s unique capacity for destruction renders modernity explicitly colonial. The very constitution of the modern world would be unimaginable without colonial relations.

In Chatterjee one reads an important distinction between the early modern and the modern with the former providing a space of potential action and the modern as a place where these practices are subsumed. The early modern in Chatterjee’s (2012: 125) Bengal still relies on hierarchical relations of Self/Other that constitute colonial relations. But the early modern as well represented a moment where “there was a more public and political domain where the idea of the citizen-subject-educated, enlightened, responsible, and conscious of his freedoms.” (Chatterjee, 2012: 125) In recovering the figures of Tipu, Tagore and Rammohan Chatterjee (2012:157) hopes to demonstrate the self-awareness that Indians possessed on the modern questions of state organization, and the freedom of the citizen. In the modern, the complex discursive structure of social relations manifested itself so that “its impact on the next phase of the historical development of colonial empire was reduced to insignificance.” (Chatterjee, 2012: 157) That Chatterjee distinguishes this ‘modern’ era in Indian from the early modern indicates an awareness of the full consequences of both philosophical and historical modernity coming to fruition at this time and it is to this formative era that one must now turn. (Chatterjee, 2012: 76)

The modern for Chatterjee is distinguished by a norm deviation structure that lays the discursive foundation for imperial relations and the manifestations of this in the historical practice in pedagogies of violence and culture. In Chatterjee one sees a fuller picture of modernity as a set of colonial relations emerging from the co-constitution of a philosophical modernity of progressive ideology and the historical modernity of uneven power relations. Chatterjee (2012: 167-173) finds in the liberal utilitarian philosophies of J.S. Mill, Jeremy Bentham the technique and moral foundations of empire. Their philosophies that fed the discourse of norm-deviation is largely consistent with the definition of philosophical modernity outlined above. In implicating these thinkers in the very nature of colonial modernity, Chatterjee points to the ideal of the liberal modern as an inherently colonial one. These philosophies (even in their universalistic guises) are based on difference, exclusion and control instead of equality and emancipation.

The principle of norm-deviation that is essential to Chatterjee’s conception of modernity rests on gradations of civilization. Jeremy Bentham began the technique of categorizing colonies on a universal standard and then applying different policies to bring them up to that standard. (Chatterjee, 2012: 168, 172)For Chatterjee (2012:186): “The norm deviation structure would establish the empirical location of any particular social formation at any given time in relation to the empirically prevailing average or normal.” Once a deviation had been tracked it could then be rectified by an appropriate policy so that it could progress to the universally desirable norm. (Chatterjee 2012, 174) In the colonies, where the people where the people were not yet civilized enough for self-rule, the best way to ensure their progress to a desirable level of civilization was through paternal despotism, a position advocated by JS Mill and supplemented by the philosophies of John Locke. (Chatterjee, 2012: 177) For the colonies, an exception had to be declared. It is evident how the paternal despotism of Mill and the idea of progress towards a universal norm advocated by Bentham relies on the progressive liberal philosophies of modernity. What is also evident is that these philosophies rely on a policy of distinction between the binaries of Self and Other, between civilized and uncivilized and between those who can determine the norm and those who cannot.

Unlike Todorov’s position that appears to indicate the emergence of Self-Other hierarchies should be located in the mind of the individual, Chatterjee emphasizes that these discursive formations would not be possible if they were not grounded in certain historical practices. The philosophy of norm-deviation both emerged from and fed into the history of modernity. Chatterjee locates three historical shifts that both enable and inform the norm-deviation structure, legal positivism, industrial capitalism, and a policy of balance of power among the European great powers. Legal positivism marked a shift from natural law theorizing that placed the sovereign status of Eastern powers in doubt and opened up the space for a justification of norm-deviation. (Chatterjee, 2012: 188) The balance of power system in Europe refocused attention away from conflict within Europe and allowed states to pursue an aggressive form of colonization. (Chatterjee, 2012: 189) Industrial capitalism provided the impetus for colonial expansion as the raw goods from the colonies were used in the production of capital goods, in a reversal of previous flows of goods. This reversal provided the basis for the global transformation that shifted material power heavily in favor the West. (Chatterjee, 2012: 76) In the undercurrent of all these historical processes was a racism of a myth of an Oriental despot and claims of superiority based on race and religion, itself a product of historical modernity and Western philosophies of progress. (Said 1978)

What one sees that is lacking in Todorov is an acute awareness of the dialectic played out between the historical modernity and the philosophical modernity. Norm-deviation is born of specifically philosophies of progress but it is grounded also in the history of colonial empire and born of a problem of colonial management. (Chatterjee, 2012: 174) Similarly norm-deviation provided a moral justification for the extraction of capital that fed into the ‘great divergence’ between global North and South. (Chatterjee, 2012: 191) These unequal power relations then could be fed back into narratives of superiority and further justification for the paternal despotism of colonial rule. With the bifurcation of Self and Other, imperial interests can then be cloaked in the “moral rhetoric of war” (Chatterjee, 2012: 195) but with the consequence that, as Carl Schmitt observes (2007:54), “war can be driven to the most extreme humanity.” What emerges from this interplay is the “privilege to declare the exception to the norm.” (Chatterjee, 2012: 337) In this definition of an imperial practice through historical and philosophical modernity we have a uniquely modern technique that produces a colonial hierarchy.

Todorov in seeing a philosophical solution that only needs to take place in the mind of the individual based on equality and difference fails to see the deep structural and discursive causes for colonial hierarchy that are marked by the interplay between history and theory and emerge in a global practice of power. Like the eighteenth century humanists who appealed to a universal humanity whose concept was “a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic-feudal system and the privileges accompanying it,” (Schmitt, 2007: 55) Todorov denies the inherently political nature of Self-Other relations as well as the deep, historical structural causes underlying them. Todorov’s humanism and his romanticization of the possibility to bring harmony to the world denote an explicit denial of the social reality and the full implications of modernity. By staying true to philosophical modernity’s ideals of progress and harmony through reason, Todorov is limited in his critique. It is also important to note that in Chatterjee’s account the voice and agency of the Other emerges in the co-constitutive nature of the core and periphery that make modernity possible.

Returning to Todorov and his philosophical solution to the problem of the Other reveals the inability of a philosophical modernity rooted in the Enlightenment liberal tradition to come to terms with the colonial consequences of historical modernity. Todorov’s faith in the modern project that a path of non-violent communication can emerge to destabilize solid identities and lead humanity to a more harmonious whole is radically undermined when viewed from the point of view of the Other. Todorov’s account speaks the language of equality and difference, but through his silencing of the Other, invariably reproduces a claim of the superiority and difference through the account of the ‘noble savage’ that he aims to disprove.  Furthermore, a reading of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth shows the limits to Todorov’s account of Self-Other relations and demonstrate that the de Sahagun ideal of cross-cultural understanding cannot possibly be an end in itself. Todorov speaks from the perspective of an outsider, claiming witness to the situation of the Other and the best way to deal with the Other while at the same time not allowing the Other to witness for himself. His account shows that modernity is limited in its ability to understand itself by the way it represents knowledge from an unacknowledged position of power. In the gaze of Todorov, as in the gaze of de Sahagun, the possibility of speaking of equality in difference is necessarily limited by the position of power from which they speak.

For Fanon, Todorov’s solution of equality in difference, if applied to a colonial context, would radically underestimate that nature of violence endemic to the colonial situation. For Fanon, Todorov’s move is one that aims to appeal to a native’s reason and ‘morality’ but in reality is a strategy to maintain a hierarchy. Fanon (2001: 33) demonstrates that “the colonized masses mock at these very values, insult them and vomit them up.” He laughs because he is aware of the futility and contradiction in Western values. The contradiction of Western values the native sees in these values is their fundamental reliance on the principles of difference and inferiority established by the norm-deviation structure and the figures of Sepulveda and Las Casas. Fanon (2001: 33) recognizes that in order for Western logos to sustain itself it relies on a mythos of racial superiority. Fanon points out “when the settler seeks to describe the native fully in exact terms he refers to the bestiary.” Just as the norm-deviation structure relied on mining different texts to demonstrate the inferiority of other civilizations (Chatterjee, 2012: 179), Fanon’s settlers rely on the mythology of the native as the embodiment of evil.Fanon also understands the “violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world” the settler uses in order to protect their Western values and the binaries of ‘civilized’ Self and ‘barbaric’ Other. The hypocrisy of Western values lies in their reliance on violence to maintain the modern order, while in the same breath they preach peace.

The futility of Western values in bringing about a successful end to a colonial hierarchy are limited by the fact this reversal requires the very deconstructing of the system of colonization that was created through violence. The only way to do this is through violence. “The naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it.” (Fanon, 2001: 28) Todorov’s inability to see this “naked truth” is due to the distance of his gaze, his inability to live the experience of the Other and so his inability to truly understand the nature of colonial hierarchies. Todorov and Bernadhino de Sahagun’s empathetic gaze from afar would provide little consolation for Fanon. While on the surface it appears like an exercise in solidarity, de Sahagun’s reconstruction does little for the native’s actual existence. As Fanon (2001: 34) points out “no professor of ethics, no priest has ever come to be beaten in his place, nor to share their bread with him.”

In Todorov’s account the Other is limited to reacting instead of acting. Todorov invariably reproduces the myth of the ‘noble savage’ that he sets out to deconstruct by claiming that their using of semiotics was inferior to that of the Europeans in understanding the Other. The Aztecs are consistently displayed as naïve and Cortes, despite the violence he incurs, a truly brilliant manipulator. (Todorov, 1999: 127) The only Aztec character who assumes any agency in Todorov’s account (1999: 100-102) is La Malinche, who from the perspective of Fanon and the oppressed, betrays her own people and helps bring about their ruin. In Todorov’s romanticized account of the non-West he points to the interaction between Self and Other as being essential towards saving the West’s own humanity. Simultaneously he denies that the Other should play any active role in this transformation and ignores the co-constitution of the global order that made modernity possible.

Todorov’s (1999:248-249) reproduction of the myth of the ‘noble savage’ and his argument that the spread of Western values stems from a superiority in the understanding of the Other indicates an ignorance of the co-constitution of the modern world but it also indicates the limited gaze that attempts to represent the Other from a position of power. In Todorov’s account the Other is never allowed to speak for himself. Todorov (1999: 54) claims this is because of his sources, but in the same moment dismisses it as trivial.  Despite Todorov’s claims to be proposing instead of imposing and that his account is more myth than history, his reconstruction of a myth that claims to understand our modern condition while leaving the native out would make Fanon’s words (2001: 61)“For the native, objectivity is always directed against him” ring true. Todorov’s moral testimony is one that requires the silence of the Other. From the view of the Other, Todorov’s philosophy is just another artificial sentinel turned to dust.

The Enlightenment, and even the beginnings of modernity that precede it, are intrinsically tied to the idea of empire. By ignoring the destructive power of capital and myth that is tied with logos Todorov underestimates the social, political and economic consequences of colonial modernity. Similarly in attempting to reconstruct a narrative that seeks to explain the Other while silencing the Other, Todorov reveals the limits of critiquing modernity from a philosophical position within modernity. But even Fanon’s radical anti-colonial position remains committed to a ‘modern’ project. Fanon’s belief that violence can be controlled by rational means in order to emancipate man into stage of humanity shows that we are all “heirs of Marx.” (Derrida, 2006: 91) The tempting promise of emancipation offered by modernity haunts both colonial and anti-colonial discourses. Instead I offer the words of Walter Benjamin: “This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.” (Benjamin, 2007: 248) These spectres of progress are not lost in the past but remain with us in our contemporary society today.Intervention and destruction is justified in the construction of the Other through Orientalism and Islamophobia, but it is tied to capitalism, the nation-state and a number of other political, social and economic institutions as well. If we truly wish to understand not only empire, but international relations itself we have to understand the political, social and economic institutions spawned by the co-constitution of colonial hierarchical relations that are an essential part of modernity as well as the nature of what it means to critique them.

The above article is been take from academia which i found interesting and sharing to my readers.